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Abstract
Several influenza pandemics have taken place throughout history and it was assumed that the
pandemic would emerge from a new human virus resulting from the adaptation of an avian virus
strain. Mexico, since 2003 had developed a National Preparedness and Response Plan for an
Influenza Pandemic focused in risk communication, health promotion, healthcare, epidemiological
surveillance, strategic stockpile, research and development. This plan was challenged on April 2009,
when a new influenza A(H1N1) strain of swine origen was detected in Mexico. The situation faced,
the decisions and actions taken, allowed to control the first epidemic wave in the country. This
document describes the critical moments faced and explicitly point out the lessons learned focused
on the decided support by the government, the National Pandemic Influenza Plan, the coordination
among all the government levels, the presence and solidarity of international organizations with
timely and daily information, diagnosis and the positive effect on the population following the
preventive hygienic measures recommended by the health authorities. The international
community will be able to use the Mexican experience in the interest of global health.
Introduction
Health threats have occurred throughout the history of the
populations in the world. The epidemiologic, demo-
graphic and risk transition processes determine changes in
the morbidity and mortality profiles of the populations.
Moreover, both the globalization and the environmental
impact involving climatic repercussions have accelerated
these changes. Throughout the history of mankind, great
pandemics have been documented; suffice to remember
those caused by the Black Death, small pox, cholera and
influenza. The latter, described as early as the Hippocratic
times, caused three large pandemics during the 20th cen-
tury: the one in 1918-19, known as the "Spanish flu", the
one in 1958-59, and finally the one in 1968 [1,2].
In particular, the 1918-19 pandemic caused, according to
estimates, between 40 and 100 million deaths at a time
when the communications and means of transportation
on earth were not as fast and efficient as they are now.
The magnitude of the public health impact at the global
level, the associated social and economic consequences,
the observed trends and the periodicity of the influenza
pandemics led the World Health Organization to support
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of developing their respective preparedness plans for this
threat [3,4].
In Mexico the interinstitutional work plan to develop the
National Pandemic Influenza Preparedness and Response
Plan was established in 2003. The plan considers, among
others, the Multisectoral Operating Strategy, which repre-
sents its translation into the specific actions to be devel-
oped by each institution before the probable emergency
of a new pandemic [5,6]. On the other hand, in view of
the persistent circulation of the seasonal influenza virus,
Mexico was one of the first countries to include, as of
2004, this biologic in its immunization regimen, focusing
on the high risk groups, mainly children and people over
60 years of age.
The Preparedness and Response Plan was structured
around various scenarios stemming from the events of
1918-19, based on which the federal reserve of medica-
tions (more than 1,000,000 treatment courses of osel-
tamivir) and supplies was created, the healthcare
guidelines were prepared, together with those for epide-
miologic surveillance and diagnosis, and the messages to
be conveyed to the population to contain the influenza
pandemic [3,4].
Within this setting, and as per the available information,
it was assumed that the pandemic would emerge from a
new human virus resulting from the adaptation of an
avian virus and that it would very likely originate in the
Asian continent, given that the latter was already being
affected and continued to have cases of influenza virus
A(51N1); more than 450 cases were documented among
humans with a fatality rate of more than 60% [5]. How-
ever, it was also thought that the new pandemic could
originate from other strains and that it could start any-
where in the world, as was the case of the new A(H1N1)
strain of a swine, avian and human origin. Thus in April
2009 the socio-epidemiologic and biologic reality tried us
[6].
The situation faced by Mexico and the decisions made are
a topic of analysis and allow us to better prepare ourselves
for a new public health threat. This document intends to
succinctly describe the critical moments faced and explic-
itly point out the lessons learned. The international com-
munity will be able to use the Mexican experience in the
interest of global health.
The epidemiologic alert
In early April an atypical situation in the behavior of acute
respiratory tract infections was seen in Mexico, character-
ized by an increased duration of transmission of seasonal
influenza, as well as by an enlarged number of admissions
during the spring, mainly in Mexico City, its conurbation
with the State of Mexico, and the State of San Luis Potosí
and Oaxaca. Likewise, the fact that young adults were the
affected age group, together with the isolation of an influ-
enza A virus that could not by typed in the reference lab-
oratory, was striking [6].
Due to the former, and according to the National Pan-
demic Influenza Preparedness and Response Plan, an epi-
demiologic alert was issued in the entire country on April
17, 2009. The alert recommended all the federate entities
to intensify their epidemiologic surveillance actions
aimed at detecting cases suspicious of unusual severe
influenza or pneumonia, with the corresponding pharyn-
geal smears. At the same time, the communication chan-
nels were reinforced to increase the collaboration with
international institutions.
On April 13, 2009 in the capital city of Oaxaca, a southern
state, a 39-year-old female died of severe atypical pneu-
monia. A local laboratory diagnosed a coronavirus as a
causative agent, leading health authorities to send the
sample to the United States Centers for Disease Preven-
tion and Control (CDC). Later, when additional cases of
atypical pneumonia were reported, samples were shipped
to the Winnipeg laboratory in Canada.
The influenza continued to behave atypically and, 5 days
after the epidemiologic alert, the necessary steps were
taken to prevent the population from attending crowded
places, and the use of the "etiquette sneeze" and frequent
hand washing were recommended as preventive meas-
ures. On April 23, the laboratory tests fully identified the
virus as influenza A(H1N1) from a virus strain unknown
until then, which meant that its behavior, virulence, trans-
mission capacity and origin were all unknown. And ini-
tially, even its susceptibility to the available antivirals, the
magnitude of the associated risk and its pandemic poten-
tial were also unknown. The previous experience of other
influenza pandemics in other countries was the only
source of knowledge.
It was also thought that as difficult as it was to stop the
spread of the virus, there was a good chance of slowing
down transmission rate and mitigating the consequences.
Therefore, that evening a "state of sanitary contingency"
was declared and informed to the population, a prepan-
demic alert was declared, and the preventive and control
measures were intensified. This meant cancelling all edu-
cation activities in the Federal District and its entire met-
ropolitan area, and in the State of Mexico; the State of San
Luis Potosí decided to implement these same measures.
Three days later, social distancing measures were imple-
mented in the rest of the country, particularly the suspen-
sion of school-based activities.Page 2 of 7
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empowering the Federal Minister of Health to coordinate
the public, private and social settings to comply with the
national ordinance concerning various general health
actions aimed at preventing, controlling and fighting the
existence and transmission of the recently detected influ-
enza H1N1 virus. The next step was summoning an
Extraordinary Meeting of the General Health Council, as
well as the National Health Council, to establish and
coordinate all the prevention and health promotion
actions, and those aimed at containing the epidemic and
providing healthcare. During the following days other
measures were implemented consisting of the suspension
of all sorts of events held indoors or outdoors, whether at
religious centers, stadiums, theaters, cinemas, bars, disco-
theques, that gatehered large groups of people as well as
all the activities of the federal public administration,
except for those that, according to the agencies them-
selves, were necessary to assure an appropriate, timely and
continuous service provision. The suggestion was also
made to interrupt the unessential services of the produc-
tive sectors and to maintain only those necessary for fam-
ilies to have basic supplies available, like food, water,
electricity and transportation, among others.
As the epidemic evolved, its behavior and effects were ana-
lyzed and decisions aimed at restoring the country's eco-
nomic, social and educational life were made. Thus 13
days after the onset of the sanitary contingency, the pub-
lic, private and social work life went gradually back to nor-
mal, and the mid-higher and higher education academic
institutions resumed their activities. Four days later the
primary education activities were gradually regularized in
most of the country, according to the specific circum-
stances in each federate entity, particularly considering the
number of new cases.
The National Response
Once the sanitary emergency was declared, various coor-
dination mechanisms were established among all the
areas involved in healthcare to contain in a timely and
organized way this emergency and, at the same time,
reduce as much as possible the negative impact of the
influenza H1N1 epidemic on the health of the Mexican
population.
To this end, regular meetings were scheduled with the par-
ticipation of the federal, state and municipal government
levels, and the secretariats of state. As per the legal frame-
work applicable in view of this sanitary contingency, the
Ministry of Health convened an extraordinary and perma-
nent meeting of the General Health Council and the
National Health Council. The former reports to the Presi-
dent of the Republic and has regulatory and advisory
roles; the latter is a collegiate body responsible for formu-
lating the health policies implemented in the Mexican
Republic and integrates horizontally and democratically
the country's 32 federate entities, it is presided by the Min-
ister of Health and the sanitary heads of public, private,
academic and social sectors, thereby the decision was
made to include in the Response Plan the following six
broad dimensions for facing the epidemic:
Risk communication
An effective communication plan was established targeted
to the general population, healthcare workers and the
information media. For this purpose press conferences
were held on a daily and ongoing basis, with the support
of all the mass media, including the internet and tele-
phone lines. The press conferences were presided by the
country's Minister of Health and by the health authorities
in each of the federate entities, who informed the popula-
tion, in real time, about the status of the epidemic in a
practical, ongoing and effective manner. Additionally,
information was distributed to the academia and the pub-
lic and private institutions in the country.
To address questions from the general public and provide
them guidance on the healthcare and psychological sup-
port services, a toll free telephone number was made
available 24 hours a day. More than 5 million calls with
questions were received.
After the first few days, the civil population would wait for
the press conferences delivered by the Minister of Health
with national coverage. This led to unification of the
knowledge and the statistical data, contributed to answer
the questions of the society, helped the people remain
calm at that time of crisis and, mostly, gained the support
of the population in complying with the epidemic-related
recommendations [7].
Health promotion
This activity was intended to affect the positive and con-
tain the negative health determinants, contributing to a
better control of people over their health. Through the
mass media and the distribution of brochures, posters and
fliers emphasis was made on the use of masks, frequent
hand washing, the use of alcohol gel, the "etiquette
sneeze", the use of disposable tissues and their proper and
hygienic disposal, avoiding overcrowded and/or closed
places, and not leaving the home, unless it was necessary
[8]. It is worthwhile mentioning that the civil population
acted responsibly and was solidary with the health
authorities in view of the possibility of a major catastro-
phe. The population of one of the largest cities in the
world adopted the suggested steps even though they
touched the most sensitive fibers of the social fabric and
affected the production of goods and services.Page 3 of 7
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Initially the aim was to assure the protection of the per-
sonnel participating in the teams that provided medical
care. Measures were taken to guarantee the supply and
availability of the supplies they required to perform their
activities [9]. All the public healthcare institutions
throughout the country opened their doors so that any-
one considered as a suspicious case of influenza, could
request healthcare that included the diagnosis and further
treatment with the antiviral agent oseltamivir. The latter
proved to work properly and to modify the patients' clin-
ical picture, particularly when administered within 72
hours of the onset of symptoms.
Technical and procedures manuals were distributed to the
healthcare services containing the working definitions of
suspicious case, probable case and confirmed case,
together with the necessary protocols for care, collection
of biological samples, treatment and reporting of cases,
thus implementing a triage system for the appropriate
classification of patients [7,10].
Contacts of all the confirmed cases of influenza virus
A(H1N1) were visited and offered prophylaxis with osel-
tamivir; an intensive case search was conducted by trained
personnel that traveled in healthcare mobile units (health
caravans) and who also delivered informative talks, did
quick diagnostic tests and participated in the health pro-
motion activities conducted in strategic zones [10,11].
At the beginning of the crisis a biological sample was col-
lected from all suspected cases of influenza for confirma-
tion purposes. However, given that the influenza virus
A(H1N1) was confirmed in 30% of the samples, the sam-
ple collection flow charts were modified trying to be more
selective. Moreover, a "quick test" was purchased and dis-
tributed massively during the crisis; it helped meet the
need for an immediate diagnostic support, for purposes of
deciding on treatment administration.
Epidemiologic Surveillance
This activity focused on two large areas. The first, and
most important one, consisted of raising the awareness of
the population by means of information dissemination
through the mass media so that, if anyone of any age had
the cardinal symptoms, i.e., fever, cough or respiratory
distress (suspicious case), they would go to the institu-
tional healthcare services in the country.
The second one consisted of collecting information on the
evolution of the epidemic. Two epidemiologic surveil-
lance systems were set up to get basic descriptive informa-
tion of the cases, including the time, the place, and the
individual. The purpose of the first system was recording
the suspected cases of influenza by collecting the above
mentioned data, as well as additional information about
the patients, like their health status, medical and health-
care history, whether they were hospitalized or not, date
of onset and resolution of the disease, probable diagnosis,
treatment provided, information of their contacts, and so
on. The National Epidemiological Surveillance System
(SINAVE) obtained information "on line" using access
codes and passwords and represented the basis of the sta-
tistical information. The second system was established to
ship biological samples to the reference lab. It led to hav-
ing a nominal registry of probable influenza cases from
whom a pharyngeal smear was taken (by definition, a
probable case was considered as a suspicious case with a
biological sample). The date of onset and the main symp-
toms as well as the sample date, besides the above men-
tioned time, place and individual data were obtained.
This system, called Influenza Surveillance System (SISV-
FLU), allowed identifying the confirmed cases of influ-
enza A(H1N1), the cases of influenza A, those caused by
other agents, and the negative cases [12].
It is a fact that during the early days we did not have, as
neither did almost any other country in the world, the
capability of identifying this new pathogen because the
essential "primer" to make the diagnosis was not available
in the market. However we did have a broad network of
laboratories certified by the World Health Organization
(WHO), which made it possible to set up the appropriate
equipment and technique for viral identification in only
three days time. The pieces of equipment were strategi-
cally placed within the lab network to extend the regional
coverage as necessary.
At the same time, a nominal registry was kept containing
the patient records and death certificates of all the cases
reported as compatible with influenza. Those records
were thoroughly reviewed by an expert group and resulted
in the registry of the deaths caused by the influenza virus
A(H1N1).
Based on the information collected - initially of the prob-
able and confirmed cases and the confirmed deaths, and
then of the suspicious cases - it was possible to analyze the
epidemic behavior on a daily basis and thus make the cor-
responding decisions with the proper rationale.
Strategic Stockpile
As per the National Pandemic Influenza Preparedness and
Response Plan [5], Mexico had personal protection equip-
ment, guidelines for the clinical management of cases,
educational and promotional materials, stores of medica-
tions (antibiotics) and antivirals (oseltamivir and zanavi-
vir), as well as other supplies that were essential to
providing timely and appropriate care. The medication
stores were supplied to the different federate entitiesPage 4 of 7
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forced with the supplies received from several countries
during the critical phase, which were also distributed
according to each state's specific needs. All the supplies
and medications were distributed throughout the health
sector institutions and to the population at no charge.
Research and Development
Different groups of national and international researchers
devoted themselves to studying the virus and characteriz-
ing it genetically and antigenically [13]. This information
was provided to WHO for its most appropriate and con-
venient use, particularly for producing a vaccine, foresee-
ing needs to protect the poorest countries. The virus'
phylogenetic tree was also determined [6]. Moreover, the
epidemic behavior was characterized as well for the bene-
fit of human beings and with the purpose of upgrading
the measures to reduce the spread of the disease consider-
ing its pandemic course.
A fund was created to provide economic incentives to the
academic and researcher groups to participate in grants to
further the knowledge on the virus, its virulence, transmis-
sibility, affected groups, severity, etc.
Response after the critical phase
The analysis of the epidemiologic behavior led to con-
cluding that Mexico had overcome the critical phase of the
influenza A(H1N1) epidemic and therefore the govern-
ment prepared itself to normalize the activities that had
been disrupted by it. To this end, the prevention and con-
trol guidelines for resuming the activities at schools, work
places, public transportation, and meeting centers were
disseminated. This enabled to resume the activities of the
public administration and the non-essential services pro-
vided by the productive and restaurant sectors and most
meeting places [7]. The establishment of checkpoints at
schools is a measure that led to maintaining a low case
number and breaks the transmission chain. Their purpose
is to timely detect the suspicious cases, refer them to the
healthcare services for proper management, and start
recording and examining their contacts.
All the players involved are aware that complete control
has not been achieved in all the states, but the trend of the
epidemic at the national level continues to be downward.
The citizenship was therefore asked to keep guard imple-
menting the preventive and health promotion actions.
Moreover the recommendation was made to follow the
basic hygiene measures of hand washing, "etiquette
sneeze", going to the doctor in case of suspicious symp-
toms, avoiding, to the extent possible, hand shaking and
kissing to greet people, using a face mask only in uncon-
trolled crowded places, like public transportation, and
maintaining the school health checkpoints. The auton-
omy of the federate entities was further supported to allow
them implementing the best strategy in case of outbreaks.
A focused control was suggested, together with the tempo-
rary closing of the schools where new cases are detected.
Considering the major potential impact of this viral infec-
tion on health and human activities worldwide, and given
that the most effective means to eventually control it is a
vaccine, the latter was considered as a social and global
asset. Therefore Mexico, through WHO, donated the
strain of this new virus to the world, to prevent the exist-
ence of a patent and reduce costs, and to develop a vaccine
to control and prevent this new type of human influenza,
which could become a major catastrophe that would fur-
ther complicate the possibilities of human development,
mainly in the poorest and unprotected populations.
The impact
As difficult as it may be to answer the question of what
would have happened if the difficult decisions made had
not been made, it is nevertheless possible to outline hypo-
thetical scenarios.
There are various useful approaches to model the poten-
tial impact of a pandemic. All of them are based on
assumptions stemming from the documentation of previ-
ous influenza pandemics, particularly in the 20th century.
Since the purpose of models is to anticipate unknown sit-
uations, the former should therefore be taken with a grain
of salt. Moreover, they include only a few of the impact
indicators of this kind of pandemia [6,14,15].
It is estimated that, in an extreme scenario, such as the one
in 1918-19, in a period of 8 - 10 weeks, 50,000 additional
deaths and more than 240,000 additional hospital admis-
sions could have occurred, as well as an excess of 14 mil-
lion medical consultations [16]. Fortunately, this scenario
did not occur.
A moderate scenario, such as the 1968 pandemic, foresaw
that without any mitigation and control measures, hospi-
tal admissions would have exceeded 30,000, deaths
would have amounted to 8,600 and almost 4.6 million
outpatient consultations would have occurred [9,16].
The fact is that up to August 28, 2009, only 187 deaths
and no more than 1,000 hospital admissions have been
reported [7]. We now know that most of the people who
died were 20-49 years old (65%). The major symptoms
were cough (86%), fever (85%), dyspnea (74%), expecto-
ration and malaise (52% and 48%, respectively), followed
by myalgia (27%), headache (25%) rhinorrhea and cya-
nosis (23% each), hemoptysis (19%), odynophagia
(18%) chest pain (14%), and the following in less than
10%: vomiting, nasal obstruction, conjunctival hypere-Page 5 of 7
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died of influenza A(H1N1), 35% of them had a history of
metabolic conditions like obesity and diabetes mellitus,
23% of smoking and 16% of cardiovascular disease, e.g.,
angina and arterial hypertension, followed by respiratory
tract and infectious conditions. The reported fatality rate
is 0.87%, the incubation period is 3-4 days, the transmis-
sion rate reported by Ro is 1.4 and the confirmation rate
of suspicious cases is 29% [7].
These figures undoubtedly show that the measures taken
had an important repercussion on population health,
compared with the data of the above mentioned models.
The actions taken contributed to contain both the magni-
tude and the rate of disease spread and allowed to save
valuable time to understand the virulence and transmis-
sion features of the virus. This time helped other countries
to better prepare themselves and helped the Mexican pop-
ulation to stop the transmission chains; this time also
showed that in the presence of threats to the population
integrity, most important of all is to protect the people's
health since, regardless of the impact of this sanitary
response on other realms of the national life, we are not
counting deaths by the thousands and the spread of the
virus within our country is under control.
The new virus is already part of the biological diversity
that human influenza viruses represent. As this new strain
will continue to coexist with us, we must pay attention to
its evolution and, if necessary, make the decisions leading
to assure the health of the population.
Lessons learned
There is a series of lessons we can draw from the influenza
epidemic.
1. The possibility of effective and timely action in the
presence of the sanitary contingency was only possible
thanks to the decided support of the President of the
Republic. With the available evidence, he instructed
and empowered the Ministry of Health to act singly at
the national level in accordance with the current legal
framework. The action involved the entire force of the
Mexican State.
2. The early planning that resulted from the National
Pandemic Influenza Preparedness and Response Plan
set the foundations for timely action. However, the
operational problems that arose could not have been
solved without the support of other Secretaries of State
pertaining to the labor, education, social develop-
ment, agriculture, economics, and treasury sectors, all
of whom acted in a solidary manner. The epidemic led
to identifying operational implications that are being
addressed and that will, in turn, permit our prepared-
ness in case of a pandemic or a new epidemic out-
break.
3. The coordination among all the government levels
was achieved mainly through the States' Secretaries of
Health by means of extraordinary meetings of the
National Health Council and the General Health
Council, and led to a joint decision making process of
the government and the society to abate this epidemic.
Despite the great coordination achieved, there were
information gaps concerning the course of the epi-
demic and particularly the data updating process, but
this situation was addressed with measures systematiz-
ing the information routes and cutoff dates. We are
implementing provisions to strengthen the timeliness
and reliability of the epidemiologic information.
4. The implementation of preventive measures that
precluded a major contingency from occurring was
possible thanks to the maturity with which all Mexi-
cans behaved and their trust in governmental deci-
sions. The trust of the population resulted in part from
the fact that Mexicans were permanently informed
with transparency and formality throughout the differ-
ent stages of the epidemic, in real time. Moreover, the
international organizations involved certified the data
generated on a daily basis and endorsed the actions
implemented by the federal government.
5. The presence and solidarity of international organi-
zations, foreign governments and private businesses
provided the technical support that facilitated both
confirming the presence of a new virus and the access
to the scientific knowledge accrued internationally.
Additionally, the in-kind contributions increased the
country's stores of medications and health supplies,
thus helping to lessen the contingency.
6. The rest of the world benefited from the Mexican
experience thanks to the timeliness with which the
government issued the sanitary alert and informed
about the course of the epidemic. The knowledge
shared by Mexico provided the countries who have
faced the human influenza virus A(H1N1) with infor-
mation about its epidemiologic characteristics, its
clinical picture and the chance of cure if timely health-
care is provided. This, in turn, has led to mitigating the
economic, sanitary and social effects. Upon donating
the strain of this new virus to the world through WHO,
Mexico has contributed to developing a specific vac-
cine that will make it possible to prevent and control
this new variety of human influenza. Moreover, the
country has given proof of solidarity and responsibil-
ity for global health even at a time of a major eco-
nomic crisis.Page 6 of 7
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7. Even though quick and effective action was taken,
the need to strengthen the epidemiologic surveillance
systems, the laboratories and the information net-
works became clear to us. We also need to update the
legislation so that it allows us to act appropriately
under pandemic situations, facilitate vaccine produc-
tion and distribution, and promote the national scien-
tific research on priority health topics.
8. As mental health is not a minor issue, mental health
programs specific for sanitary emergencies are neces-
sary to address their psychological effects on the
healthcare personnel, patients, their families and the
general population. The latter effects, however, did
not occur during this pandemic because the people
were oriented and referred accordingly through the
toll-free number.
9. The epidemic had a positive effect on the popula-
tion from the perspective of the personal and environ-
mental preventive hygiene measures. We therefore
constantly urge the citizenship to turn the latter into a
healthy habit that becomes part of self-care and to
adopt other healthy personal habits.
The emergence of the new influenza virus will undoubt-
edly become a public health landmark and will be
recorded in the annals of world history. Those of us who
have the opportunity of living this unique experience
today must learn from it to strengthen the capabilities and
overcome the weaknesses of our healthcare systems. In
doing so, this new resident of the global world will cause
the least possible havoc.
The influenza A(H1N1) epidemic in Mexico has not fin-
ished yet, and currently we continue been in permanent
alert to face the next winter season period.
References
1. Taubenberger JK, Morens DM: 1918 influenza: the mother of all
pandemics.  Emerg Infect Dis 2006, 12:15-22.
2. Kilbourne ED: Influenza pandemics of the 20th century.  Emerg
Infect Dis 2006, 12:9-14.
3. Organización Mundial de la Salud: Plan Mundial de la OMS de Pre-
paración para una Pandemia de Influenza Ginebra: Organización Mun-
dial de la Salud; 2005. 
4. Zhang X, Meltzer MI, Bridges CB: Flu Workloss 1.0: Manual para
ayudar a los funcionarios de salud pública de los niveles
estatal y local a calcular la repercusión de la pandemia de
gripe sobre la pérdida de días de trabajo (versión beta de
prueba).  In Centros para el Control y la Prevención de Enfermedades,
Departamento de Salud y Servicios Sociales de los Estados Unidos Traduc-
ción de OPS, Washington DC; 2005. 
5. Kuri-Morales P, Betancourt-Cravioto M, Velázquez-Monroy O, Álva-
rez-Lucas C, Tapia-Conyer R: Pandemia de Influenza: la
respuesta de México.  Rev Salud Pub Mex 2006, 48:72-79.
6. Fraser C, Donnelly C A, Cauchemez S, et al.: Pandemic Potential
of a Strain of Influenza A (H1N1): Early Findings.   [http://
www.sciencexpress.org/]. 11 May 2009/Page 1/10.1126/sci-
ence.1176062
7. Secretaría de Salud   [http://www.salud.gob.mx]
8. Secretaria de Salud, Dirección General de Promoción de la
Salud   [http://promocion.salud.gob.mx/dgps/interior1/
lineamientos_influenza.html]
9. Wilson N: The potential impact of the next influenza pan-
demic on a national primary care medical workforce.  Hum
Resour Health 2005, 3:7.
10. Secretaria de Salud   [http://portal.salud.gob.mx/contenidos/noti
cias/influenza/profesionales_salud.html]
11. Secretaria de Salud   [http://www.caravanas.salud.gob.mx/]
12. Secretaria de Salud, Centro Nacional de Vigilancia Epidemi-
ológica y Control de Enfermedades   [http://
www.cenavece.salud.gob.mx/emergencias/flu-index.htm]
13. Garten R J, Todd Davis C, Russell C A, et al.: Antigenic and
Genetic Characteristics of Swine-Origin 2009 A(H1N1)
Influenza Viruses Circulating in Humans.   [http://www.sci
encexpress.org/]. 22 May 2009/Page 1/10.1126/science.1176225
14. Meltzer MI, Cox NJ, Fukuda K: Modeling the economic impact of
pandemic influenza in the United States: implications for
setting priorities for intervention.  Background Paper  [http://
www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol5no5/melt_back.htm].
15. Ferguson NM, Cummings DA, Fraser C, Cajka JC, Cooley PC, Burke
DS: Strategies for mitigation and influenza pandemic.  Nature
2006, 442:448-4.
16. Kuri-Morales P: "La pandemia de influenza: posibles escenar-
ios en México".  Gaceta Médica de México 2008, 4:285-290.Page 7 of 7
(page number not for citation purposes)
